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A Note on the Law Reform Commission of Canada’s 
Theoretical Approach to Criminal Law Reform
Even a superficial study of our present criminal system immediately 
reveals the pervasiveness of a classical, conservative, puritanical ideology. 
The classical ideology is essentially a conservative one because it advo­
cates a return to former ways of thinking, glorifying as it does a 
mythical period in the history of mankind when things were supposedly 
much simpler. People knew exactly what was expected o f them, 
because they believed in the absolutes of a Natural Law. Political 
institutions were an integral part of the total universal scheme, and 
the principal mission of the state (personalized in the monarch) was to 
maintain the integrity o f the nation. In this regard, criminal law was 
called to play a vital role in the enforcement of morality. A decline 
of morality necessarily meant the destruction o f the nation.
Since morality was at stake, nothing could stand in the way of the 
criminal process. No punishment was too great for a crime: the Code 
of 1648 o f the Massachusetts Bay Colony, modeled on the Old Testament, 
prescribed the death penalty for rebellious sons.1 Deterrence was the 
decisive factor. Whatever measure was needed to deter persons from 
the commission of a particular crime was justified.
Codification is often considered a progressive step towards law 
reform. However, if not regularly revised, codification tends to impede 
the natural development of the law and its adaptation to changing 
social conditions and attitudes. O ur criminal code is a typical example 
of this.
The adoption of Sir James Stephen’s criminal code by the Canadian 
Parliament in 1893 fitted nicely with the Victorian mentality of our 
society at that time. Since the business of criminal law was mainly to 
enforce morality, and since moral principles were considered immutable, 
what area of the law was better suited to codification than criminal law?
It is interesting in this respect to compare the distribution of 
powers under our federal system to that of the American federal 
system. The rising liberal-positivist ideology which clearly dominated 
the foundation period of the American nation was quite consistent 
with the idea o f a diversification of criminal standards according to 
local morals and beliefs. By contrast, our federal system, inspired by 
a classical ideology perceived the criminal law as above the considera­
tions of local cultural differences.
‘See Quinney, The Social Reality of Crime (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), at 63.
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The punishment aspect of our criminal process is also very much 
indicative o f a classical ideology. Deterrence is adhered to in the 
belief that the criminal is solely responsible for his actions. If some form 
of rehabilitation is approved, it is in terms o f moral conversion.
Seen in this light, the Law Reform Commission of Canada’s 
approach to criminal law reform 2 appears quite revolutionary. The accent 
on decriminalization and restraint is clearly in radical opposition to the 
classical theory o f criminal law, whose objective was to arrive at a 
comprehensive code of moral conduct. It is also strikingly consonant 
with the capitalist theory of economic liberalism which supports the 
least intervention possible by the state in the conduct of human affairs. 
It is at least a first indication of a liberal-positivist ideology.
Several other principles in the Commission’s philosophy tend to 
confirm this finding. The whole concept of society as a “cooperative 
enterprise,” the members of which “must have some give and take, 
must respect each other’s needs and vulnerabilities, and must enjoy 
some mutual trust and reliance,”3 is characteristic of the social contract 
theory that lies at the heart o f the liberal-positivist philosophy. 
Society is seen as a human enterprise as opposed to the actualization 
o f a transcendent destiny.
The social contract approach goes hand in hand with a plural­
istic view of society. As long as morality is seen as part o f the 
Natural Law, there can only be one perfect moral system. If  two 
conflicting moral values emerge, there can only be one conclusion: 
one of them at least is wrong. But the liberal-positivist approach is 
entirely different: moral values are the result of human interaction and 
interests. Therefore, whatever conception one has of society and its use­
fulness to him will determine his particular set of values. As various 
cultural groups tend to have different views and interests, moral values 
inevitably come into conflict.
Having recognized a basic conflict at the root of human interaction, 
the liberal-positivist theory then sets out to resolve it through the concept 
of democracy. Liberal-positivist democracy, based essentially on the 
majority rule, is rendered possible through the legal fiction of the social 
contract. Regardless of their deep natural differences and capacities, 
once the members o f a collectivity have mutually agreed to live together, 
they become legally equal. Since there are no natural values superior 
to others, prevailing values will be those that the majority decides are 
worthy of protection. Laws should emerge only from a consensus, 
and that consensus is the consensus of the majority.
’Sec Law Reform Commission of Canada. Our Criminal Law (Ottawa: 1976).
3Ibid , at 20
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Debate plays an essential role in the formation of this consensus, 
for the legal fiction of social equality does not eradicate the natural 
inequality between individuals. It simply ignores it for a particular, 
legal purpose. Those individuals who are naturally superior to the others 
because of their higher degree of intelligence and aggressiveness have 
no right, in a democratic system, to impose their will otherwise than 
by the sole force of persuasion. Liberal-positivist theory places an 
infinite value on the capacity of reason to resolve all differences. 
Whatever their individual interests may be, it is believed that through 
public discussion and understanding, members of the collectivity can be 
brought to share the same ideals and to recognize the overall “public 
interest.”
The importance of public debate also lies at the heart of the 
Commission’s report. This almost unlimited faith in the virtues of 
public debate is perhaps most striking in the Commission’s discussion 
of private ownership. After having classified this subject as one of 
special concern, in light of increasing pollution, depletion of resources, 
poverty, unemployment, inflation, race conflicts, terrorism and aliena­
tion, the Commission then lays down its program :4
Immediately we plan to improve and simplify the present law on property 
offences. Later we hope to initiate more general consideration o f  the basic 
problem and so foster debate across the country — in schools, colleges and 
universities, in churches, societies and community associations, in police 
forces, prisons and indeed all contexts where there is concern with social 
justice. That way we may eventually achieve a general consensus on ownership.
In order to emphasize the consensual aspect o f the Commission’s 
philosophy, Professor Goode o f Dalhousie University has felt the need 
to oppose the so-called value-consensual model of the Commission to 
the more contemporary value-antagonism model.5 The natural reaction 
which came from Professors Barnes and Marlin,6 o f Carleton University, 
was one of “surprise that of all commissions such criticisms should be 
directed at the Law Reform Commission of Canada,”7 reminding 
Professor Goode that, “the i st chairman, Mr. Justice E. P. Hartt, 
stressed the fragmentation of values in modern society.”8 Indeed, the 
writings of the Commission consistently point to a pluralistic approach.
Despite a passing remark that, “not all applications of the value 
antagonism model are Marxist,”9 Goode’s article obviously tends to
‘Ibid., at 21.
5M. R. Goode, Law Reform Commission of Canada — Political Ideology of Criminal Process Reform (1976),
54 Can. B. Rev. 653.
*|. Barnes and R. Marlin, Radical Criminology and the Law Reform Commission of Canada — A Reply 
to Professor M. R. Goode, (1977) 4 Dalhousie L. J. 151.
7 bid., at 153.
•Ibid.
*Supra, footnote 5, at 666.
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equate consensus with liberal-positivist theory and conflict with radical 
theory. Such equation appears both misleading and unnecessary, for it 
fails to take into account the sort of non-radical form of pluralistic 
thinking that Lukes has illustrated.10
A true value-consensual model is one which results from a classical 
theorv of society. Liberal-positivist theory attempts to resolve the funda­
mental conflict of values and interests by introducing the concept of de­
mocracy based on a rationally developed consensus. Radical or critical 
theory is also founded upon a value-antagonism model, but it maintains that 
the fundamental social conflict continues in existence beyond the 
deceitful appearances o f consensual democracy. By failing to make 
these distinctions clear, Goode has understandably made himself vulner­
able to the following criticism:11
G oode’s technique o f  argument is to take isolated passages from Com­
mission papers and to identify in these resemblances to the descriptive 
liberal-positivist or value-consensus theory. He then recites the attacks 
made on the theory and concludes that the Commission’s work must suffer  
from the same deficiencies.
Goode’s criticism of the Commission’s approach would have been 
stronger and more credible had it not attempted to deny the presence 
of a value-antagonism model, but had instead attempted to show that 
the type of pluralistic approach adopted by the Commission is the 
liberal-positivist kind, as contrasted with the radical kind. However, 
nothing in the article indicates that Goode himself approves of the radical 
approach. The only object of his comment was to show that the Law 
Reform Commission had not given sufficient consideration to the ideas 
of the new criminologists and, by failing to do so, had done nothing 
more than to rationalize the status quo.
This conclusion is questionable. One must take a very distorted 
view o f the Commission’s approach to be able to say that it supports the 
status quo. The present criminal system, as we have seen, is based on a 
puritanical ideology which is hardly comparable to the philosophy of the 
Commission.
T he distinction between “social law reform ” and “legal law reform ,” 
as expounded in a recent article by Professor Samek of Dalhousie 
University,12 sheds a new light on the present controversy. Legal law 
reform, it is said, seeks merely to bring the law in line with modern 
social conditions. Social law reform, on the other hand, is an attempt 
to use the legal process as a means of changing our social conditions
'•S. Lukes, Power: A Radical View (London: Macmillan, 1974).
“ R. A. Samek, A Case for Social Law Reform (1977), 55 Can. B. Rev. 409.
"Su^ra, footnote 6, at 155-156.
COMMENTS •  COMMENTAIRES 229
and institutions themselves to bring them more in line with our ideals 
and aspirations.
The Law Reform Commission has unequivocally stressed the need 
for significant social reform and has stated its confidence that public 
debate will indirectly result in various types of social reform. However, 
the Commission has also taken the position that it would be illusory 
and wrong to think that criminal law can and should be used for social 
reform purposes:13
In itself criminal law never brings about the good society, it just removes some
o f  the more obvious impediments to it and helps provide the framework within
which that society can create itself. Criminal law has limited aspirations.
The Commission’s objective in dealing with the criminal law system 
is therefore clearly limited to bringing it in line with present social 
conditions, while hoping that the present social conditions will improve. 
In this context, Barnes and Marlin have quite correctly perceived the 
Commission’s report as a trem endous breakthrough. But, if one was 
expecting from the Commission a totally new outlook on society, one 
will naturally be very disappointed. In this regard, Barnes’ and Marlin’s 
statement that, “much of the Commission’s work, then, is consistent 
with the findings of the radical criminologists,”14 is indeed preposterous.
Radical criminology has emerged largely from the earlier studies 
and findings o f labelling theorists, who were reacting against the 
traditional approach to criminals based on deviance. On the principle 
that crime is in the eyes of the beholder, labelling theorists inverted 
the perspectives by taking the attention away from the officially desig­
nated “criminals” and re-directing it at the formulators of crime. Their 
studies attempted to show that the real reasons for the apparent crime 
epidemic in the lower classes of society did not lie in the convicted 
criminals themselves, but lay mainly in the fact that those in the upper 
classes o f society had the entire discretion to decide what type ot 
behaviour was going to be labelled as “criminal” and what type of 
criminal behaviour was going to be detected and prosecuted. Labelling 
theory, referred to as the “ideology of the underdog.”15 is a typically 
idealistic approach to the social reality ot crime.
Radical criminologists have drawn upon the studies o f the labelling 
theorists in criticizing the unidimensional approach of traditional 
criminology. But they have refused to confine the problem within the 
traditional bounds of criminal law theory. In their view, the manifestation
“ See R. V. Ericson, From Social Theory to Penal Practice: The Liberal Demise of Crimmological Causes 
(1977), 19 Can. J. ofC rim inol. & C o i t .  1: 170 at 179.
liSupra, footnote 2, at 7.
l*Supra, footnote 6, at 153.
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of crime is but one element in the overall scheme of social interaction. 
The only effective way to bring about any significant change is by 
contributing to the destruction o f these social attitudes and institutions 
that are completely inconsistent with freedom and mutual respect. 
Therefore the only effective action is a political action, i.e. one that 
affects the relations of power within the social sphere.
Barnes and Marlin find that the Commission’s affinity with the 
radical criminologists is evidenced by the fact that both groups “favour 
a withering away of law as an instrument of centralized social control.”16 
The analogy is absurd. The Commission’s advocacy of restraint in the 
use of criminal law is akin to the capitalist principle of liberalism. 
It is based on the belief that, rather than controlling crime, criminal 
law used abusively will only cause more problems. Radical theorists, 
on the other hand, generally advocate an increased use of the legislative 
process if one wishes to achieve meaningful social reform without 
resorting to violence. The “withering away of law” is not perceived 
as an immediate concern, but as the natural consequence o f an eventual 
society based on freedom.
It may be added, in passing, that the mere suggestion of a government- 
appointed law reform commission composed mainly o f jurists taking a 
radical approach to criminal law reform  is almost unimaginable.
But even without expecting the Commission to go as far as 
embracing the principles of radical criminology, one would not be 
entirely unjustified, it seems, in hoping that the Commission might 
approach criminal law reform from the point of view of social law 
reform, to a limited extent at least. Instead of placing as much emphasis 
on decriminalization and on the distinction between “real crimes” and 
“regulatory offences,” the Commission could advocate a more equitable 
redistribution of the criminal law among all sectors of society. This 
would imply not only removing .some of the minor street offences 
(whose presence on the books is mainly due to cultural differences) 
but also tightening up on white-collar crime. It would also imply a re­
orientation o f the law-enforcement process towards various commercial, 
industrial, administrative and political activities. One hopes these are 
directions in which the Commission will move in formulating future 
recommendations.
GÉRARD SNOW*
l*Supra, footnote 6, at 153.
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